Rorty’s Humanism by Višňovský, Emil
 















Emil Višňovský, « Rorty’s Humanism », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
[Online], XII-1 | 2020, Online since 16 June 2020, connection on 26 June 2020. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1878  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1878 
This text was automatically generated on 26 June 2020.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-





This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the
contract No. APVV-18-0103, “Paradigmatic Changes in the Understanding of Universe
and Man from Philosophical, Theological, and Physical Perspectives.”
“As a good bourgeois liberal [… I] cannot figure
out what is supposed to be wrong with
‘humanism’ […]” (Rorty 1997: 36) 
 
1. Introduction
The pragmatist conception to which Richard Rorty subscribed holds that philosophy
has to serve a mission: to be relevant to cultural practice and to provide “descriptions
of the human situation” (see Rorty 2010a: 13, 14, 17). Rorty’s metaphilosophical journey
took him from his sophomore question – “what, if anything, philosophy is good for?” –
to his attempts to find a “more constructive way of doing philosophy” and to obtain
“an overview of the culture” by playing imaginative philosophical language games in
order “to serve some human purposes better than others” (ibid.).1 This is philosophy’s
humanistic mission and almost no philosopher – including anti-humanists such as
Heidegger or Foucault – would deny that they are motivated to provide humanity with
images  or  stories  about  “who we are,  where  do  we come from,  and where  we are
going.” But Rorty’s humanism is not just about understanding philosophy’s mission. He
was a  malcontent who wished to “change the subject” almost  from the outset  (see
Tartaglia  2020).  This  may,  of  course,  be evident to those who are able  to  “get  him
right.” After his Kehre (see Gascoigne 2008: 78-106) the substantial parts of his oeuvre
advanced ideas that justify labelling his pragmatism as humanistic (see Schulenberg
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2015). However, we have to be more explicit about the nature of this humanism. That is
what I attempt to do in this paper.2
The  doctrine  of  humanism  –  however  defined3 –  seems  to  sit  comfortably  in
pragmatism, in both the classical and some contemporary versions.4 Rorty, in many
ways,  follows  his  pragmatist-humanist  predecessors,  even  though  the  roots  of  his
humanism are more diverse, as I explain below.5 In my exposition, I focus on Rorty’s
secular humanism, which I believe lies at the center of his thought, leaving aside for
the moment any connotations of religious humanism.6 My main objective is to show
that humanism is integral to his philosophy and to explain what it consists in. First, I
provide, in sections 2 and 3, an account of key humanist sources, both pragmatist and
non-pragmatist.  Section  4  examines  (the  few)  recent interpretations  of  Rorty  the
humanist. In section 5, I focus on the distinction between the human and nonhuman as
the central feature of his humanism. Section 6 outlines Rorty’s project to humanize
humanity. In the concluding section, I summarize the key features of his humanism.
But  first, I  have to  sketch the introductory working concept  of  humanism I  use  to
explore Rorty. It is both descriptive and normative, and inspired to some extent by
Rorty  himself.  Humanism  is  a  philosophical  outlook  that  provides:  1)  a  certain
description of “who we, humans, are” and “what makes us human” (descriptive part);
and 2) an understanding of the “value of human being for human being” (normative
part).7 In a social and ethical context, humanism is a conception of human relations in
the sense of “how humans see humans” or “what a human means to a human.”8 To my
understanding,  being a humanist  does not mean playing God (in the “cult  of  man”
sense which Sartre rightfully rejected),  nor does it  mean being uncritical of human
vices. It nevertheless means holding the view that there is no higher value for a human
than (another) human. This general humanistic framework is helpful when rereading
and rethinking Rorty’s overall  contribution,  I  think,  and especially his ethics.  I  will
refer to selected features of his humanistic ethics in due course below. But we should
be clear that it would be very odd to think of any kind of pragmatist ethics, including
Rorty’s, outside the humanistic framework.
 
2. Pragmatist Context
Rorty’s  version  of  humanism  encompasses  aspects  of  classical  and  neoclassical
pragmatist doctrines enriched by post-linguistic and Romantic strands. Let us look first
at the former. 
Charles Sanders Peirce famously had no explicit use for humanism and criticized both
William James and F. C. S. Schiller for making it a key feature of – or even a label for –
pragmatism (see Pihlström 2004a;  Pietarinen 2011).  But for James,  humanism was a
type  of  philosophical  thinking  (equivalent  to  pluralism)  with  fully-fledged
epistemological,  ontological  and  even  theistic  connotations,  not  merely  normative
ethical ones: 
The  humanism,  for  instance,  which  I  see  and  try  so  hard  to  defend,  is  the
completest truth attained from my point of view up to date. But, owing to the fact
that all experience is a process, no point of view can ever be the last one. Every one
is insufficient and off its balance, and responsible to later points of view than itself.
You, occupying some of these later points in your own person, and believing in the
reality of others,  will  not agree that my point of view sees truth positive, truth
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timeless,  truth that  counts,  unless  they verify  and confirm what  it  sees.  (James
1988: 875)
James’s “humanistic principle” that “you can’t weed out the human contribution” (ibid.:
598), for the “trail of the human serpent is thus over everything” (ibid.: 515), was fully
embraced by Schiller. He saw humanism “as expressive of what is the most distinctive
novelty in the Pragmatic Movement” (Schiller 1912: X) and defined it as follows:
Humanism is really in itself the simplest of philosophic standpoints: it is merely the
perception  that  the  philosophic  problem  concerns  human  beings  striving  to
comprehend a world of human experience by the resources of human minds […]
Humanism has no quarrel with the assumptions of common-sense realism; it does
not  deny what  is  popular  described as  the  external  world.  It  has  far  too  much
respect for the pragmatic value of conceptions which de facto work far better than
those of the metaphysics which despise them. (Schiller 1907: 12-3) 
John Dewey’s humanism is another weighty chapter, containing not only his theoretical
thoughts, related especially to his educational mission, but also his social and public
intellectual  initiatives  such  as  co-signing  “Humanist  Manifesto  I”  (1933).  Dewey’s
humanism was even more embedded in naturalism than James’s was (see Pihlström
2004b). He wrote:
Humanism is a portmanteau word. A great many incongruous meanings have been
packed into it. […] At all events, what Humanism means to me is an expansion, not a
contraction, of human life, an expansion in which nature and the science of nature are made
the willing servants of human good. (Dewey 1930/1984: 283-266)
Both the Jamesian and Deweyan types of humanism include the principle of meliorism,
that is the idea that human beings have the potential to become better creatures than
they were in the past (see Koopman 2009: 19). 
Later  Dewey’s  pragmatist  humanism/humanist  pragmatism  was  developed  in  the
works  of  his  most  important  student,  Sidney Hook (1902-1989),  and in  turn by  his
students and other Deweyan followers, above all the neoclassical pragmatist Paul Kurtz
(1925-2012).  They proposed the doctrine of  secular (atheistic)  humanism and began
moving away from metaphysics  and epistemology and closer  to  ethics  and politics.
Hook outlined what he called an “existential humanism,” derived from Feuerbach as an
ethical ideal to be contrasted with religious humanism (Hook 1961). Kurtz subsequently
summarized Hook’s thinking as follows:
Humanism, as he defines it, is an ethical philosophy. It encompasses everyone who
believes in the separation of church and state, the secularization of values, and the
view that morality can be based upon experience and reflection. (Kurtz 1983: XI)
For Kurtz, humanism had become the leading topic both intellectually and socially. His
aim  was  to  promote  “neo-humanism”  as  superseding  all  other  humanisms,  for  he
considered them insufficiently inclusive and ineffective.  He wrote and published “A
Neo-Humanist Statement” (2010), consisting of 16 principles based on ideas and values
that “express renewed confidence in the ability of human beings to solve the problems
we encounter  and to  conquer  uncharted frontiers.”9 In  his  numerous  philosophical
writings, he aligned humanism with eupraxophy, his practical philosophy of a good life
(Kurtz 1989a). He regarded humanism as a very rich and complex concept, “virtually
synonymous with what it means to be human” (Kurtz 1989b: 9), comprising “the virtue
of  courage,  an  emphasis  on  human  power,  a  willingness  to  create  and  seize  new
possibilities, and the capacity to exercise freedom of choice” (ibid.:  32) etc. At some
point he adopted the following “minimal core definition”: 
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First, humanism expresses a set of values and virtues emphasizing human freedom
and autonomy. This ethical theory contrasts with divine-command ethics. Second,
humanism,  particularly  secular  humanism,  rejects  supernaturalism.  Humanism
should not be simply equated with atheism; however, it proposes a reflective form
of agnostic or skeptical atheism. Third, secular humanism is committed to a key
epistemological  principle:  a  method  of  inquiry  that  emphasizes  reason  and
scientific  objectivity.  Fourth,  it  has  a  non-reductive naturalistic  ontology drawn
from the sciences. Last, humanist philosophers should not only be concerned with
theoretical issues, but with the role of humanism in practical life as an alternative
to theistic religion. (Kurtz 1998: 5) 
Summing up, these pragmatists understood humanism as the following set of doctrines:
1) a type of philosophical thinking based on self-reflection on human existence and its
possibilities (James, Schiller); 2) a naturalistic philosophy of human being as the basis
for pursuing human good (Dewey); 3) a secular ethical philosophy (Hook); and 4) a non-
reductive naturalistic ontology and secular ethics serving practical human purposes in
accordance with the scientific image of the world (Kurtz). As we shall see below, Rorty’s
focus on the human over nonhuman incorporates the gist of these features.
 
3. Linguistic and Literary Turns cum Romanticism 
Rorty’s  humanism  bears  all  the  features  of  his  new  pragmatism,  which  was  aptly
labelled  “prophetic”  (West  1989;  Hall  1994).  It  is  far  from  being  a  merely  linear
continuation of the work of his classical predecessors (see Malachowski 2010). It would
not  have  become  what  it  is  were  it  not  for  at  least  two  of  its  non-pragmatist
components: the linguistic turn and Romanticism in the broad sense of the word (both
are  often  referred  to  as  the  “postmodern  turn”).  While  the  linguistic  turn  was  a
substantially new component of pragmatism,10 Romanticism was not.11
The linguistic  turn  –  “the talk about the world by means of talking about a suitable
language” (see Rorty 1992:  8)  –  has led to the notion of  the centrality of  linguistic
practices  in  philosophical  thinking about  human life.  Rorty  (1995:  35)  conceded:  “I
linguisticize as many pre-linguistic-turn philosophers as I can, in order to read them as
prophets of the utopia in which all metaphysical problems have been dissolved, and
religion  and  science  have  yielded  their  place  to  poetry.”  Humans  are  Darwinian
linguistic beings and this evolutionary development has had far reaching consequences
for philosophical anthropology and philosophy of culture. 
Despite his “pragmatist turn,” Rorty never abandoned the issue of language. We are
entirely justified in calling him a “linguistic neopragmatist” (see e.g. Calcaterra 2019).12
He has remained a  “linguistic  philosopher,”  espousing “the view that  philosophical
problems  are  problems  which  may  be  solved  (or  dissolved)  either  by  reforming
language, or by understanding more about language we presently use” (Rorty 1992: 3).
Understanding the language (vocabularies) people use – put simply “why we talk the
way we do” – was a question that would concern him throughout his career. But it
cannot be identified with his rejection of analytic philosophy.13 Becoming a pragmatist,
Rorty constantly thematized the issue of language. Moreover, the “linguistic stance”
became  the  paradigm  through  and  within  which  he  interpreted  all  other  issues.
Nevertheless, he did not consider language an epistemic mirror of nature, nor did he
think we should look for metaphysics and ahistorical meanings in it. Rather he saw it as
a practical and social creative instrument for constructing and re-constructing our
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human world either directly through narratives and metaphors, or indirectly through
the  coordination  of  our  social  practices.  Language  is  a  medium  for  the  human
transformation of the world via social practices.14
I consider this linguisticization to be both the stronger and the weaker side of Rorty.
Stronger because it  has liberated philosophy of language from the abstract analytic
confines of representationalism and foundationalism (with their questions about the
relations  between  language  and  mind,  and  language  and  world)  so  we  can  better
understand  the  sociocultural  contexts  and  practices  (and  questions  regarding  the
relations between languages), i.e. in studies of the way languages are actually used and
applied. It is his weaker side because Rorty notoriously refused to consider experience
(and the relations of language to it). 
His stronger side is relevant to his humanism.15 Making things look different – either
good or bad – by re-describing (re-interpreting) them in language and by inventing
new vocabularies was one of his main philosophical intentions (if not the primary one).
As early as in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature he claimed: “redescribing ourselves is
the most important thing we can do” (Rorty 1979: 358-9). He continued: “We are the
poetic  species,  the  one  which  can  change  itself  by  changing  its  behavior  –  and
especially its linguistic behavior, the words it uses” (Rorty 1982c: 346).
This  understanding  of  language  brought  Rorty  closer  to  his  “literary  turn”  –  the
literary conception of  philosophy and literary humanistic  culture.  It  also  served to
resurrect the problematics of rhetoric and communication (see Langdorf & Smith 1995)
and, most of all, philosophical support for poetry. The Nietzschean “strong poets” are
those who have the potential to change us and our cultures. Prioritizing conversation
over  confrontation,  edification  over  cognition,  inspiration  over  sophistication,  and
imagination over  truth –  such were  the  humanistic  goals  that  ought  to  be  tackled
through cultural  politics.  For Rorty,  poetic,  romantic  and utopian are synonyms:  “I
think of the course of human history as a long, swelling, increasingly polyphonic poem
– a poem that leads to nothing save to itself. When the species is extinct, ‘a human
nature total message’ will not be a set of propositions, but a set of vocabularies – the
more, and the more various, the better” (Rorty 1995: 33).
The creative power of language has many uses – therapeutic (like in Wittgenstein and
James), self-constitutive (like in Freud and Proust) or community-constitutive (like in
Dewey and Habermas) – and diverse purposes – private (aesthetic) and public (ethical-
political). Rorty demonstrated this by analyzing works of literary art (Nabokov, Orwell,
Proust).  His  intentions  remained  humanistic  throughout,  when  advocating  the
elimination of unnecessary cruelty and human suffering, the extension of solidarity
and social  hope,  and the expansion of  empathy and loyalty,  or love and fraternity.
Implementing  the  Deweyan  ethical  ideal  of  “creating  common  good”  (see  Dewey
1932/1985) was the whole point of imaginative conversations about these issues and of
reading  (or  writing)  great  works  of  literature.  Nonetheless,  Rorty’s  stress  on  the
“ubiquity of language” is far from the postmodernist ideas of Derrida and Foucault,
who founded their anti-humanism, drawing on Heidegger, on the death of the subject
and the idea that it is not the subject who uses language, but vice versa, it is language
which uses the subject (see Rorty 1989: 113; Rorty 1991b: 39-48). 
Romanticism  –  “the thesis  that  what  is  most  important  for  human  life  is  not  what
propositions we believe but what vocabulary we use” (Rorty 1982a: 142) – may be taken
(as  indeed  it  has  been)  as  a  sort of  dividing  line  between  the  “two  pragmatisms”
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(Mounce  1997):  scientistic  pragmatism  and  romantic  pragmatism.  Romantic
pragmatism draws on Hume, Herder, Hegel, Nietzsche, Romantic poets and American
transcendentalists.16 The chief instrument for creating human good is the imagination
(Rorty quotes Shelley in 2007: 108). Its key agent is the “strong poet” (see Nietzsche
2000:  299)  who is,  according to Rorty (1989:  20,  26),  “the vanguard of  the species,”
“humanity’s  hero.”  Strong  poets  are  best  suited  to  self-creation  which  is  most
important for humans. We are self-interpretive and self-creative beings and there is
nothing more we should and could do than to produce better self-descriptions that
might lead us to a better human future. 
Rorty  had  a  romantic  mind  which  made  him a  humanist.  A  romantic  mind  is  not
shallow, dumb, primitive or narrow, but is as sublime and noble as the minds of those
who dream of divine or cosmic beauties in nonhuman metaphysical spheres. Rorty’s
romanticism serves several purposes. It posits: 1) poetry against Platonism; 2) romance
against the Enlightenment; 3) imagination against reason; 4) literary narratives against
scientism; and 5) edification and utopia against traditional philosophy. It also serves
the romantic impulses he favors over transcendence. He thought transcendence should
be transformed into philosophical poetry. He wanted to combine Dewey and Nietzsche
to support his humanistic project against Heidegger. He considered it “a good project,
worth pressing ahead with” (Rorty 2000: 215), but insisted that we “should be more
Nietzschean in our willingness to say ‘Thus I will  it’  rather than ‘Thus the Intrinsic
Nature of Reality obliges me.’ We should be more ‘humanist’ in the sense of that term
which Heidegger endeavored to make pejorative” (ibid.: 216). He cannot therefore resist
calling his pragmatism/humanism post-Nietzschean, which in this case is a synonym
for the Romantic.17 Although Nietzsche has been interpreted as both a humanist (Pavur
1998) and an anti-humanist (Thomas 2013), at least three of his “ends” inspired Rorty:
the end of God, of Truth, and of Philosophy as metaphysics (see de Castro 2011). The
first, “de-divinization,” is a reference to traditional religion no longer being relevant,
and the arrival of “romantic polytheism” (Rorty 1998b). The second, “perspectivism,”
concerns the fact that truth is a human creation, and that what we have are just human
interpretations  and endless  redescriptions,  not  objective  or  neutral  representations
(Rorty  1989).  And  the  third,  “de-transcendentalization,”  means  that  everything  is
historical and contingent, and followed by philosophy as “a kind of writing” and the
telling of edifying narratives (Rorty 1982a).
Of course, one can argue that self-creation applies primarily (or even exclusively) to the
private life of the “ironist,” as many of Rorty’s critics have done (see e.g. Ballaci 2017).
But for Rorty, being humanistic means being moral, and being moral means practicing
solidarity  in  public  life.  Solidarity  is  one  of  the  touchstones  of  his  humanism.  His
“liberal utopia” is a community based on the idea that our connections with our fellow
humans are of the utmost importance. His key humanistic ideal was to “enlarge human
freedom” (Rorty 1982a: 69-70), the Millian prerequisite for self-creation. He revealed
his humanistic credo as early as 1979 in his APA address: “In the end, the pragmatists
tell us, what matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together against the dark,
not our hope of getting things right” (ibid.: 166; italics added). The issue of “what to do with
our lives,” both privately and publicly, became the center-piece of his philosophy: “Our
Western liberal picture of a global democratic utopia is that of a planet on which all
members of the species are concerned about the fates of all other members” (Rorty 1998a: 12;
italics added).  This  is  the  Deweyan  social  dimension  –  caring  about  social
transformation – expressing concern about humanity, its global fate and future. 
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4. Motivations and Upshots: What’s the Point of
Calling Rorty a Humanist?
So  what  is  the  point  of  calling  Rorty  a  humanist?  Can  we  judge  whether  he  is  a
humanist  based on his  motivations or  the upshots  of  them, or  both? The standard
readings of Rorty of which there are many, have not, by and large, been conducted
through  the  lens  of  humanism.  Among  the  epithets  applied  to  Rorty  such  as
“postmodernist,” “liberal ironist,” “relativist,” “pluralist,” ethnocentrist,” “elitist,” and
“anti-philosopher,  that  of  “humanist”  is  poorly  represented.  The  humanism  in  his
thought  tended to  be  overlooked,  with  a  few exceptions.18 One  might  wonder  how
Rorty,  the  anti-Platonist,  could  ever  be  a  humanist  if  Platonism  has  become  the
humanist paradigm? Furthermore, it would have been deeply paradoxical for Rorty to
be called “a humanist” by those who placed him in the postmodernist camp, insisting
on  its  “anti-humanism.”  More  confusion  emerges  over  one  of  Rorty’s  heroes  –
Heidegger  –  who  radically  opposed  any  type  of  humanism  for  several,  mostly
metaphysical, reasons.19 And finally there are his staunch opponents, for whom Rorty
was no humanist, but rather an anti-humanist who, with his radical counterintuitive (if
not irrationalist) philosophy, came to destroy all the solid pillars of Western humanism.
Even fellow pragmatists had difficulty recognizing the continuity between Rorty’s work
and Dewey’s naturalistic humanism (although the Jamesian-Schillerian strand would
have been quite obvious). 
It was none other than Richard Bernstein, Rorty’s closest philosophical comrade and a
humanist in his own right (see Bernstein 2017), who was the first to read Rorty as a
humanist  (see  Bernstein  1982).  Bernstein  thought  “the  common  project  of  Rorty,
Habermas, and Gadamer” was “non-foundational pragmatic humanism” (ibid.: 355-6),
despite  humanism having become “a  dirty  word” after  the  devastating critiques  of
Heidegger, Althusser, and Foucault. Nonetheless, the humanisms of the first three “may
yet serve as a vision that can move us [… and] enable us to cope with the darkness of
our times and orient our praxis” (ibid.:  356). In his brilliant interpretations of social
thought,  Bernstein  explained  that  “Enlightenment  must  not be  confused  with
humanism”  (Bernstein  1991:  143).  And  he  thought  Rorty  “champions  James’s
humanistic pragmatism” (Bernstein 1983: 204). More recently he came to call it a “deep
humanism” but not, alas, until after the demise of Rorty (Bernstein 2010). Bernstein
suspected that Rorty would not have accepted any such label due to his aversion to
anything “deep,” yet believed “that there has been a deep and persistent humanism
that  is  characteristic  of  his  life  and  his  thinking”  (ibid.:  201).  Ultimately,  though,
Bernstein thought otherwise and remains unconvinced, despite not having raised any
relevant  arguments  against  this  “deep  humanism,”  apart  from claiming  that  Rorty
“doesn’t provide us with the foggiest idea of how to achieve (or even approximate) the
goals and hopes that he cherishes” (ibid.: 214).
To understand this  backstepping,  one has  to  bear  in mind that  Bernstein,  with his
classical  Deweyan  (and  quasi-Marxian)  background,  has  different  expectations  of
philosophy  and  humanism than his  late  friend.  Both  philosophers  understand  that
there is no humanism without social practice; however, the difference is that Rorty
thought humanism (and philosophy) was a matter of linguistic practice, or what he
called cultural politics, whereas for Bernstein it is also about non-linguistic practice or
Rorty’s Humanism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
7
experience. For the humanistic goals and hopes common to both (and anybody else) to
be achieved would for Rorty mean changing just the vocabularies people use, whereas
for Bernstein it would mean changing forms of life, social institutions, mutual human
relations,  and  the  like.  Bernstein  (like  all  Deweyans)  understands  that  changing
vocabularies may in the long run lead to a change in the forms of life, but Rortyans
have to understand that the forms of life are not the same as linguistic practices which
– no matter how important they are – are merely a part of the former.
Rorty’s pragmatism was declared “humanistic” in the very first monograph20 on his
philosophy,  by  Konstantin  Kolenda  (1990),21 who  provided  both  a  sympathetic
reconstruction and a thoughtful  rebuttal  of  some of  the criticisms of  Rorty –  quite
exceptionally at that time (see also Kolenda 1991). These concern motivations. Kolenda
argued that Rorty’s humanism was motivated by his attempts to “establish a closer
connection between thought and life” (Kolenda 1990: xiii); to heed “some of the best
impulses of our religious and humanistic traditions” (ibid.: 50). Kolenda read Rorty in
these philosophical-humanistic contexts because it is the “the connection of knowledge
with human growth” (ibid.: 25) – not merely knowledge for the sake of knowledge – and
the  ideal  of  “optimal  human  flourishing”  (ibid.:  65)  via  “edification”  that  bring
philosophy to  its  humanistic  mission.  Within such a  framework,  Kolenda construes
Rortyan replies to Kantian questions concerning human knowledge, action, and hope.
He is clear on what has not been “gotten right” in Rorty, namely his strategy for what
should be done with that part of our culture called philosophy. Having understood and
become frustrated at the concerns of traditional professional philosophy since Kant –
to strive for objective knowledge and put it on the secure path of science – and having
launched a powerful  attack on that strategy,  Rorty preferred to seek a new way of
philosophy  rather  than  abandon  it  altogether.  The  ancient, pre-modern  mission  of
philosophy as unique intellectual and cultural practice was to be the ars vitae and to
serve  humanity  through  its  wisdom.  This  Rortyan  transformation  of  philosophy  is
humanistic  in  its  roots  and  orientation,  according  to  Kolenda.  Rorty  considers  its
centerpiece to be the pragmatist practical concept of human “coping” with reality, not
the analytic theoretical “copying” reality. It is crucial that philosophers deal with the
anthropological issues of “what to do with our lives?” as well as the axiological issues of
the value of life. Humanist philosophers “would not be those who knew a Secret, who
had won through to the Truth, but simply people who were good at being human”
(Rorty 1982a: xxxix). Rorty’s metaphilosophy is his reaction to what can be termed the
anti-humanism of professional philosophy,  consisting in its  abandonment of  human
issues  that  pragmatists  like  Dewey  considered  the  kernel  of  philosophy.  Modern
philosophy has followed science in its search for laws of reality that can be applied to
humanity (or manipulated for the sake of humanity), proclaiming that this is precisely
in  humanity’s  interests.  But  this  is  not  quite  true.  The  scientism  and  traditional
arrogance  of  philosophical  claims  to  speak  on behalf  of  humanity  have  nothing  in
common with philosophers’ humanism. Philosophers must reflect on who they are as
members of a particular, historically concrete community and culture.22 
In the subsequent decade (1990-2000), discourse on Rorty’s humanism was rare, almost
absent, even though Rorty was developing his thinking (see sections 5 and 6 below).
Consequently, Kate Soper’s (2001) analysis which asked whether Rorty was a “humanist
or  anti-humanist?” was timely,  important  and revealing,  especially  given his  direct
reply  to  it.  Here  we  come  to  the  “upshots.”  In  Soper’s  judgment  Rorty  has  to  be
considered a humanist  and in more than just  one way:  First,  he is  an atheist  (or a
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secular) humanist because he is  an anti-foundationalist,  an anti-deistic thinker who
propagates the “de-deification” (or “de-divinization”) of the world and anti-theological
therapy for humanity, arguing that “humanity is not answerable to any transcendent
deity”  (ibid.:  117).  Second,  he  is  a  “Promethean”  or  “anthropocentric”  humanist
because he advocates  freedom and human powers to  re-create history (ibid.:  118).23
Third, he is a progressivist humanist because he supports change, innovation, historical
optimism, and other features which Soper critically attributes to his American cultural
identity and social tradition. Alas, fourth, he is not an “essentialist” humanist since, in
his  opinion,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  human  nature  nor  any  intrinsic  essence  of
anything else  (ibid.: 121).  And fifth,  he  is  not  a  “teleological  humanist”  since  he  is
against  all  metaphysics  including  teleology  (ibid.).  In  addition,  Soper  raises  further
charges  against  Rorty’s  humanism  such  as  elitism,  gender-blindness,  and
inconsistencies relating to some common or universal features, such as resistance to
cruelty, humiliation, and the ability to feel pain (ibid.: 122-3). 
What lurks explicitly on the whole in the background of Soper’s discussion – along with
her implicit skepticism about whether being a humanist is a good thing and what kind
of a humanist we should be – is her attack on Rorty’s purported philosophical anti-
realism, which she feels cannot be combined with humanism. But in his response Rorty
concedes, graciously softening the differences and refining the detail: “Prometheanism
is not a matter of claiming superior causal power. It is a claim about authority rather
than about power – namely, the claim that the non-human things that have power over
us (vultures, comets, and the like) have no authority over us” (Rorty 2001: 131). He
concludes:
I  am a humanist in the first two senses, but not in the third. I  have no faith in
human benevolence, though I have hopes for it. If I had to bet, I would bet that
within a few centuries we shall have reverted to post-nuclear holocaust barbarism,
and that all the good work done by the Enlightenment and by Romanticism will
have to be done again. But I do not think such a reversion is inevitable, any more
than I think that continuous progress is inevitable. (ibid.: 133)
What can be drawn from this unique open exchange? It seems that at this stage Rorty’s
humanism  was  solid,  self-confident  and  centered  around  the  idea  of  private,
existentialist, autonomous self-creation, though it was open to the challenge that its
public relations required a rethinking.  Nonetheless,  if  humanism means betterment
and had anyone asked Rorty  “who is  responsible  for  it?,”  he  would  certainly  have
replied: “Every one of us for herself.” It is very doubtful that one can rely on anybody
else in this,  let alone the public.  Rorty’s humanism is liberal in stressing individual
responsibility  for  self-creation,  but  it  is  not  anti-social  since  solidarity  is  its
counterpart. This is how he comes to claim that humanism without a universal human
nature is possible. 
“Rorty really was a ‘humanist,’” claims Randall Auxier (2010: xix) in his attempts “to
make a case for understanding Rorty as a humanist in a quite specific sense.” He places
his humanism in the context of ancient (Cicero, Seneca, and Epictetus),  renaissance
(Pico della Mirandola and Michel  de Montaigne) and modern (Emerson and Dewey)
humanisms, arguing that what is special about all of them – the “cardinal virtues of
rhetoric – eloquence, wisdom, and prudence” – is applicable to Rorty as well. However,
Rorty “belongs most comfortably among the prudent humanists” (ibid.).  Auxier aims
not at the festive, but the cautionary role of humanism that is underpinned by the idea
that “we are neither quite beasts nor angels, and certainly we are not gods, but we are
Rorty’s Humanism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
9
not nothing” (ibid.: xx), which Rorty espoused as well. It is a humanism which aims at
knowing our value, either actual or potential, and thus retains both dignity and hope as
counterbalances to death and falling. It is a wise humanism that aims at knowing our
limitations  as  well  as  our  possibilities,  and  at  learning  to  accept  them  and  make
something good out of them. Auxier thus summarizes Rorty’s conversational/literary
(as  a  substitute  for  eloquent),  edifying/poetic  (a  substitute  for  wise)  and  utopian/
imaginative (a substitute for prudent) humanism, that 
we  can  never  learn  anything  without  first  making  ourselves  vulnerable  to  the
possibility of making errors, to our contingent human mode of existing. Hope is the
strength to  make ourselves  vulnerable,  and that  is  the  condition of  knowledge,
because it is a condition of learning. Our compensation of mustering the strength to
hope is that we might, with time and effort, become eloquent, wise, and prudent.
(ibid.: xxix)
Rather than put philosophy “on the secure path of science,” Rorty’s intention was to
return it to “the service of humanity.” This is a complex notion with many facets. The
first is the distinction between the human and nonhuman, and it is this that makes a
fundamental difference. 
 
5. In his own Words: Human over Nonhuman 
Rorty  neither  wrote  a  treatise  on  humanism,  nor  did  he  –  in  line  with  his
metaphilosophy – provide a “theory” or a “conception” of humanism in his writings.24
He did not declare that he was taking an explicit “humanistic turn” in addition to his
other turns (linguistic,  pragmatist,  literary).  But it  also should be clear that “Rorty
wants philosophy to reassume a humanistic form” (Malachowski 2011: 89). And not just
the form. What is more important is the strategy, on which he wrote: “In short, my
strategy […] is to move everything over from epistemology and metaphysics to cultural
politics, from claims to knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to suggestions about
what we should try” (Rorty 1993: 57). His commentators explained: “The humanistic
embeddedness of philosophical activity that is expressed in this strategy stands at the
center  of  Rorty’s  transformative  pragmatism  (in  the  strongest  sense)”  (Egginton  &
Sandbothe 2004: 79). Rorty himself provided a self-reflective interpretation of how he
was  proceeding.  At  various  points  he  explained  how  he  had  adopted  “the  overall
humanist  position”  according  to  which  “there  are  no  acts  called  “assent”or
“commitment” we can perform that will put us in a relation to an object different than
that of simply talking about that object in sentences whose truth we have taken into
our lives” (Rorty 2004: 137). 
Studious readers will  not have failed to notice,  along with Richard Bernstein (2010:
211), that:
Whether  Rorty  is  dealing  with  abstract  metaphilosophical  topics,  or  the  hotly
debated  philosophical  issues  concerning  truth,  objectivity,  and  the  nature  of
reality, or ethical and political issues concerning human rights, or even with the
role  of  religion  in  our  daily  lives,  there  is  a  dominant  theme  that  emerges
repeatedly.  There  is  nothing  that  we can rely  on  but  ourselves  and our  fellow human
beings. There is no outside authority to which we can appeal – whether we think of
it as God, Truth, or Reality.25 
And as Rorty put it (2010b: 474):
I am a hedgehog who, despite showering my reader with allusions and dropping
lots of names, has really only one idea: the need to get beyond representationalism and
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thus into an intellectual world in which human beings are responsible only to each other. 
(italics added)
In other words:
to get to the point where we no longer worship anything, where we treat nothing as a
quasi-divinity,  where  we  treat  everything  –  our  language,  our  conscience,  our
community – as a product of time and chance. To reach this point would be, in
Freud’s words, to “treat chance as worthy of determining our fate.” (italics added)
The foothold for Rorty’s humanism is the core idea of his philosophy – the idea of anti-
representationalism. “By an antirepresentationalist account I mean one which does not
view knowledge as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring
habits of action for coping with reality” (Rorty 1991a: 1). Originally this was an anti-
epistemological idea;  however,  it  has much broader “humanistic aspirations” (Rorty
2004: 135). It is key to the possibility of being fully human in an epistemic, moral or
political sense. Rorty (2004: 132) explained:
I think F. C. S. Schiller was on the right track when he said that,“Pragmatism […] is
in reality only the application of Humanism to the theory of knowledge” […] I take
Schiller’s  point  to  be  that  the  humanist’  claim  that  human  beings  have
responsibilities only to one another entails giving up both representationalism and
realism.
What  is  wrong  with  representations,  either  mental  or  linguistic,  from the  Rortyan
humanistic point of view? It is not just that there is no such thing as representations,
because  there  are  no  epistemic  representational  relations  between  humans  and
nonhuman reality (such as “mirroring” or “copying”), but also that those who play this
Cartesian linguistic game make humans doubly dependent: once on what they take as
surrogates (substitutes) for nonhuman (objective) reality, and second, through these
“copies” they call “representations” of reality itself. Believing in representations also
involves what Rorty calls  the “sado-masochistic” game of  constant efforts  to  verify
whether representations correspond adequately to reality. In practice, this amounts to
the dictate of the nonhuman over the human. Dictatorship by nonhuman reality is the
worst thing that can happen to humans.26 It is the most inhuman thing, but it need not
happen. There are other possible relations between human and nonhuman.
Rorty reveals that the concept of nonhuman reality to which humans think they must
subject themselves is either reality that has no human description in human language
(Kantian thing-in-itself), or reality that has some privileged description (Platonic ideal
reality) presented as if the description were not a human creation but given to us by
the  reality  itself  in  its  own  language  (science)  and  which  somehow  mystically
corresponds to the human mind or language. But the “world does not speak. Only we
do” (Rorty 1989: 6). Only we can ascribe language to the world of nature; only we say
that its language is the language of our human physics or mathematics. Thus we are
close to thinking that science is more than human, or even nonhuman. Through such a
discourse  we  lose  our  sense  of  humanity,  or  we  may  never  have  had  it  since  this
dependence on the nonhuman world is humanly self-imposed, no matter whether the
nonhuman authority with power over humans is God or Church, Truth and Science or
State  and  Nation.  There  are  two  possible  kinds  of  desire  at  the  bottom  of  this
antihumanism  –  or  rather  inhumanism:  a  Platonic  desire  to  get  in  touch  with
something superhuman (“the realm of forms”), and a Kantian desire to understand the
law of nature (“the starry heavens and the moral law”).  Both versions involve “the
impossible  attempt  to  step  outside  our  skins  –  the  traditions,  linguistic  and other,
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within  which  we  do  our  thinking  and  self-criticism  –  and  compare  ourselves  with
something absolute” (Rorty 1982a: ixi).
It would be completely wrong to contend that Rorty ignores nonhuman reality or that
he thinks that humans are not in touch with it. We are by no means isolated from it. As
a Deweyan, he knows very well that we constantly interact with our environment, and
that these interactions are causal and exert pressure on us. However, this reality does
not dictate how we should describe it  in our language, nor the kind of attitude we
should take towards it (for instance, we can respect it and revolt against it, we can take
it as a subject matter and an instrument, or prevent it from becoming our master nor
our slave, etc.). We, humans, have created language as our instrument for coping with
this reality, and we are free to use both – language as well as reality – according to our
human purposes. Human freedom in particular is the basis for humanism. No freedom,
no humanism.  What  is  more  important  is  that  if  there  is  any  kind of  freedom we
humans achieve with respect to nonhuman reality, we achieve it only thanks to our
cooperation.  We,  humans,  are  interdependent  on  one  another  and  responsible  or
answerable  to  each other.  Therefore  Rorty  writes  that  the  “anti-representationalist
account of belief is, among other things, a protest against the idea that human beings
must humble themselves before something non-human, whether the Will of God or the
Intrinsic Nature of Reality” and that “anti-representationalism” is “a version of anti-
authoritarianism” (Rorty 1999: 7). Rejecting the authority of anything above humanity
that  is  nonhuman  or  extra-human  is  also  a  part  of  this  anti-authoritarianism.  We
humans have only those authorities we have created, and these are the only authorities
we  have  to  either  respect  or  re-create.  We  are  fully  self-creative  beings  mutually
responsible to ourselves. And since there “is no authority outside of convenience of
human purposes that can be appealed to in order to legitimate the use of a vocabulary
[…] we have no duties to anything nonhuman” (Rorty 1998a: 127). Not respecting or
being aware of this would mean not possessing the Romantic Emersonian self-reliance
without which there is no humanism either. Rorty insisted that “we should be more
‘humanist’ in the sense of that term which Heidegger endeavored to make pejorative –
more willing to take power into our own hands” (Rorty 2000: 216). But even Rorty’s
friendly opponents (cf. Stout 2007: 8-9) took this as narcissism and anthropocentrism.
Rorty was urged to retort: 
What Stout calls narcissism, I would call self-reliance. As I see it, the whole point of
pragmatism is to insist that we human beings are answerable only to one another.
We are answerable only to those who answer to us – only to conversation partners.
We  are  not  responsible  to  the  atoms  or  to  God,  at  least  not  until  they  start
conversing with us. (Rorty 2003: 6) 
Humanism has to be creative in order to free us from all monsters, systems, necessities,
and to embrace contingencies, chances, finitudes, to get relief from the past, to escape
from all inhumanities, from the bad times to hope for good times. And from truth to
creative freedom, because the search for truth as a goal of life and progress is inhuman.
To take our destiny into our hands is  not identical  to taking power and ruling the
nonhuman world we did not create.
Rorty’s  attack  on  “epistemologically centered  philosophy”  was  a  challenge  to  the
culture of modernity and Enlightenment with its monomaniac ideal of One Big Truth.
Humanism does not consist in subjecting humans to One Big Truth in the delusion that
this  Truth  does  not  depend  on  humanity  presuming  that  humanity’s  mission  is
discovering it either by luck or as a gift from some guru or through the hard work of an
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army of scientists. Humanism does not consist in humans sacrificing another human
for  the  sake  of  this  One Big  Truth.  Humanism consists  in  the  way humans behave
towards humans, in what humans mean to humans, and in what value humans ascribe
to humans. Humanists replace the value of humanity for the value of One Big Truth: 
“Humanism” can mean a certain Platonic-Cartesian-Kantian account of what it is to
be  human.  But  it  can  also  mean,  and  to  the  untutored  it  typically  conveys,
participation in the hopes of the Enlightenment – and specifically the hope that
human beings, once they have set God and the various surrogates for God to one
side, may learn to rely on their own romantic imagination, and their own ability to
cooperate with each other for the common good. (Rorty 1996: 14)
This  is  the  philosophical  use  of  the  concept  of  humanism:  descriptive  rather  than
normative. It served Rorty’s purposes of describing the character of philosophy as a
cultural practice with respect to other intellectual practices: 
Intellectuals  cannot  live  without  pathos.  Theists  find  pathos  in  the  distance
between the human and the divine. Realists find it in the abyss separating human
thought and language from reality as it is in itself. Pragmatists find it in the gap
between contemporary humanity and a utopian human future in which the very
idea  of  responsibility  to  anything  except  our  fellow-humans  has  become
unintelligible, resulting in the first truly humanistic culture. (ibid.: 133; italics added)
He continued to outline this concept of “humanistic culture,” which he had hinted at
when  reflecting  on  “Philosophy  in  America  Today”  as  a  humanistic  discipline.
Contrasting it with the dominant scientistic and technocratic culture that is even more
crudely prevalent, and not just in America, he wrote: “it is a mark of humanistic culture
not to try to reduce the new to the old, nor to insist upon a canonical list of problems
or  methods,  nor  upon a  canonical  vocabulary  in  which problems are  to  be  stated”
(Rorty  1982a:  218).  Humanistic  culture  is  “a  culture  that  is  more  deeply  and
unreservedly humanist than that offered by the arrogant scientism that was the least
fortunate legacy of the Enlightenment” (Rorty 2004: 134), and that “will emerge only
when  we  discard  the  question  ‘Do  I  know  the  real  object,  or  only  one  of  its
appearances?’  and  replace  it  with  ‘Am I  using  the  best  possible  description  of  the
situation in which I find myself, or can I cobble together a better one?’” (ibid.: 135). 
This  triggers  both  questions  and  a  crisis:  if  there  is  no  One  Big  Truth  (even  one
discovered by Science) common to all humanity that we could all strive for, or if such
an ideal is doomed, how are we to live without it? How can we navigate our human lives
in the post-Truth era? Rorty’s philosophical humanism does not claim the situation is
that hopeless and that there are no truths, principles, values, or criteria for living a
human life. He is simply against universal, absolutist and formal ahistorical criteria.
Neither does he say that all criteria are equally good. Most of all, he is constantly re-
creating new and better criteria, and these can hardly be impartial or neutral regarding
human goals and intentions. Thus what matters for humanity are goals and intentions
that articulate the meanings of human lives.
What Rorty’s humanism advises us is that we should turn from nonhuman to human
reality in our social practices. The former, not created by us and as important as our
environment, should neither be our ultimate value, nor the highest authority to which
we ought to submit. Some may read this as Rorty’s “anti-environmentalism,” but that is
not what Rorty is advocating. To my understanding, by making this radical distinction
between the human and nonhuman, he urges us to turn to what is and ought to be most
important for us humans: our mutual relationships and our shared life in communities.
The Rortyan humanistic logic advises us to take care of humanity, and reality will take
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care of itself. Or take care of culture, and nature will take care of itself.27 It does not
work the other way around. 
The  Rortyan  humanistic  prioritizing  of  the  human  over  nonhuman  has  important
normative repercussions for ethics. These include the ethics of responsibility (through
the value of human being), ethics of care (through empathy and sympathy), ethics of
love and friendship (through the concept of fraternity), ethics of justice (through larger
loyalty), etc. The common denominator of all this is his idea of enlarging our human
circles  by  recognizing  that  others  are  like  us  (Rorty  1989:  xvi),  prone  to  pain  and
capable of joy, by extending our understanding of “we humans” through imagination
and feeling. 
 
6. Rortyan Project to Humanize Humanity 
If Rorty’s humanism is integral to his new pragmatist philosophy, the pillars of which
he set out in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the consequences of this humanism are
even more culturally ambitious. He has outlined what could be termed the project to
humanize humanity, motivated by the “danger” of the “freezing-over of culture” and the
“dehumanization of  human beings”  (Rorty  1979:  377).  It  began with his  concept  of
edification with its plurality of descriptions and self-descriptions. But it is rooted in the
Enlightenment,  the  linchpin  of  modern  humanity,  which,  however,  cannot  be
considered without its counterpart, Romanticism. Emancipation, the key watchword of
the  Enlightenment,  is  not  sufficient.  To  it  we  must  add  self-creation,  the  key
watchword of Romanticism. Rortyan humanistic philosophy contains the hope that we
can overcome the impasse of Enlightenment versus Romanticism, and reason versus
imagination.  Enlightenment  without  Romanticism  is  cruel  (i.e. dogmatically
disciplinary);  Romanticism without Enlightenment is self-destructive (i.e. wildly self-
creative). Thus each without the other is hopelessly anti-humanistic.
Rorty does not refrain from discussing his project in the Kantian terms of the maturity
of humanity. He surmises that: 
If we do things the pragmatist way, we will no longer think of ourselves as having
responsibilities toward nonhuman entities such as truth and reality. Following the
pragmatists, we will be no more inclined to think that we are responsible toward
other entities than human beings, […]
continuing:
I have often suggested that we regard pragmatism as an attempt to complete the
project common to Renaissance humanists and the Enlightenment. The pragmatists
think that it is time to stop believing that we have obligations either to God or to
some God’s surrogate. The pragmatism of James, like the existentialism of Sartre, is
an attempt to convince us to stop inventing such surrogates. (Rorty & Engel 2007:
40)
The  Rortyan  project  of  humanization  involves  going  beyond  secularization  via  de-
divinization, de-scientization, and de-philosophization, to go beyond the successors of
the  Enlightenment  era.  It  all  adds  up  to  the  poeticization  of  culture or  the
establishment of a humanistic culture. The new name for this culture (dropping the
prefixes of post- and de-) is a “poeticized culture”; one that is “no longer dominated by
the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic enhancement” (Rorty 1979: 13);
one in which religion may flourish without gods, science without representations, and
philosophy without confrontations.
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Rorty  was, of  course,  fully  aware  that  this  was  a  utopian  culture,  but  utopian  as
synonymous with inspirational as a kind of imagination in a pragmatist not a Marxist
realist sense. Utopias are useful, not because every little detail has to be implemented,
but because they supply us with visions, hopes, and better possibilities. Utopias do not
allow us to escape time and our human finitude. They lend meaning to our lives as
“finite, mortal, contingently existing human beings” derived from “other finite, mortal,
contingently existing human beings” (Rorty 1989: 45), and as images of the future that
differ from past and present. 
Whereas  Rorty  hoped  to  go  beyond  the  Enlightenment  mainly  through  new
Romanticism which he sees as a correction of the extremes of the former through the
humanness  of  the  latter  –  that  is, emancipation not  from prejudices,  but  from the
excesses of Enlightenment rationality – today we might think of going beyond both the
Enlightenment and Romanticism, either with the help of Rorty, or even going beyond
Rorty. In pursuing such a project, we would reach the limits of Rortyanism, but we are
not there yet, since there is a lot in his legacy we can and have to learn from. Among
the limits that can be identified even now are the possibilities of linguistic practices
with respect to non-linguistic experience; the limits of individual self-perfection in the
private sphere; and the limits of liberal democracy in the public sphere. All these limits
require the creative Rortyan imagination to show us the way beyond the impasses of
conversation  and  action,  irony,  and  solidarity  (even  cynicism  and  empathy),  and
happiness and efficiency (“wild orchids and Trotsky”). 
What might prove promising would be to explore how Rorty’s main intentions could be
put together:  emancipatory and self-creative,  Deweyan and Nietzschean,  pragmatist
and existentialist. It is not enough to free humanity from its self-imposed restrictions
and false authorities in order to enlarge and expand human potential  (and even to
liberate philosophers from ideas that have held them captive since Plato and Descartes
to  Frege  via  a  Wittgensteinian  therapy).  It  requires  the  imaginative  and  creative
capabilities for a better life and world – a human life and the human world in which we,
humans, are the only authorities responsible to and for ourselves. 
Dewey  was  right:  “Humanism  is  a  portmanteau  word.  A  great  many  incongruous
meanings have been packed into it” (Dewey 1930/1984: 283). It is no easy task being a
humanist,  let  alone  a  Rortyan  humanist  in  the  contemporary  world  in  which  the
posthumanist  heirs  of  postmodernist  anti-humanists  infer from the claim “we have
never  been fully  human”  (see  Braidotti  2013)  the  controversial  conclusion  that  we
never will be. For them, being a humanist is not such a straightforward positive epithet.
Humanism in all its entirety is presented as obsolete, out of place, and to be abandoned.
Even more so for the transhumanists, despite their attempts to portray themselves as
super-humanists  in  the  sense  that  transcending humans via  technology  is  the  best
thing humans can envisage and do. If Rorty were still alive, he might see this as a direct
shot in the heart. His humanistic ideas and values should urgently be extended into the
current post- and trans-humanist era. 
 
7. Conclusion
Rorty’s philosophical trans-pragmatist humanism is very rich. It includes many more
features than I am able to sketch here.28 But the following strands should be clear: 1) a
holistic approach to humanity as the highest value as against an approach to something
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particular; 2) the affirmation that humanity is the highest authority (self-authority) as
against  all  nonhuman  phenomena;  3)  promotion  of  self-creation  as  the  greatest
imaginative  (poetic,  artistic)  way  of  a  valuable  human  life  as  against  rationalistic
technologies;  and  4)  solidarity  (empathy,  sympathy)  as  the  most  important  social/
ethical norm as against cruelty, suffering, and humiliation as the utmost evil humans
can perpetrate against humans.
On the one hand, this is a view of humanism as everything that encourages humanity,
faith in our powers, human flourishing, and self-reliance rather than mistrust. On the
other hand, it is everything that eliminates the evil inflicted on humans by humans.
Humanity  constantly  interacts  with  its  nonhuman  environment,  which  it  cannot
ignore. But humanity is dependent on how it understands itself and behaves towards
itself, on how humans treat each other. We are in charge and we are responsible for our
self-creation, no matter how the world is. However, this is not only the most we can do
for ourselves, but also the most sublime – to serve nothing else than our humanness.
This is not anthropocentrism, nor does it disrespect nonhuman reality or nature. But
neither is it worship of something to which we should prostrate ourselves. It is de-
divinization of the world, but not the divinization of ourselves. We are not gods and
should not play at being gods. Rorty’s key intention was to achieve “a world-historical
change in humanity’s self-image” (Rorty 1998a: 132) and “to get rid of the traditional
philosophical picture of what it is to be human” (Rorty 1989: 19).
Rorty was a  dreamer,  a  philosophical  poet.  He imagined the future of  humanity as
saved from all  conflicts and confrontations,  full  of  cooperation not competition. He
hoped for a human world in which love would be “pretty much the only law” (Rorty &
Vattimo 2005: 40). A world in which there would be no absolutes to worship, in which
philosophers would “stop aping science” and human beings would no longer try to
escape the historicity and contingency of their existence (Rorty 2010a: 23). It was truly
utopian, but by no means irresponsible.
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NOTES
1. For one of the most instructive overviews of Rorty’s intellectual journey in this direction, see
Voparil (2010). 
2. For instance when establishing “usefulness” as the key criterion of philosophy, he did not spell
out that he meant “usefulness for humanity” in one way or another (perhaps he thought it self-
evident). Humanism is what is useful for us humans in the sense that it serves our lives and
future.
3. For more general studies of humanism, both conceptual and historical, see Copson & Grayling
(2015).
4. For a recent discussion of the relevance of pragmatist humanism, see Honnacker (2018). 
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5. Rorty’s humanism has multiple roots. Besides pragmatism (Jamesian and Deweyan), the roots
are Hegelian, existentialist (Sartrean), hermeneutic (Gadamerian), post-structuralist (Derridean),
feminist and even anti-Marxist, anti-Heideggerian and anti-Foucaultian. There is not the space to
deal with them all here.
6. Rorty, famously, was not one to avoid discussions about religious humanism. See Hardwick &
Crosby (1997).
7. This is close to Sartre’s interpretation of humanism “that takes man as an end and as the
supreme value” (Sartre 2007: 51). 
8. The well-known terms for these relations are homo homini lupus (ancient); homo homini deus
(medieval); and homo homini hominus (modern). All deserve elaboration which I cannot provide
here.
9. [kurtz.institute/neo-humanist-statement].
10. Although classical pragmatists wrote about language, their philosophy focused on the notion
of  experience (among other things)  and so may be considered as  having stopped before the
linguistic turn. It was Rorty who opened the gate for pragmatists.
11. On  the  romantic  (mostly  Emersonian)  roots  of  pragmatism  see  the  works  of  Russel  B.
Goodman (1990, 2008, 2015) and (Wheeler 1993).
12. This led to the common misinterpretation that he is a “linguistic idealist,” i.e. an antirealist
who holds that “everything is language and all objects are only linguistic constructs” (see Farrell
1995: 161; Conant 2000: 275). 
13. Rorty acknowledged analytic philosophy for the linguistic turn, but rejected its conception of
language.
14. Rorty  resolutely  and  rightly  objected  to  the  idea  that  language  was  the  medium of  the
relation  between the  human being  as  subject  and  the  world  as  object.  But  when I  say  that
language  is  a  medium,  I  mean  it  is  a  medium  for  human  practices  (for  an  outline  of  my
conception of human practices, see Višňovský 2018). 
15. “The claim that Rorty is a ‘humanist’ is based, in part at least, on his faith in our ability to
freely choose and invent new vocabularies for describing ourselves” (Guignon 1982: 362).
16. For a confrontation of the key points of both, see the imaginary conversation between Peirce
and Rorty compiled by Haack (2006: 688-9).
17. David Hiley (1988) dubbed it  “the Nietzschean-Sartrean strand” of Rorty’s thought in his
polemics  against  Charles  Guignon  (1982)  who,  by  contrast,  thought  Rorty’s  thinking
postmodernist  and  incompatible  with  pragmatist  humanism.  A  Sartrean  existentialist  motif,
which Rorty embraced, reads: “there is no legislator other than man himself” (Sartre 2007: 53).
18. These are e.g. Skowroński (2015), who devotes a chapter to Rorty’s neopragmatist humanism,
and  Schulenberg  (2015),  who  aptly  elucidates  “how  pragmatism,  humanism,  anti-
authoritarianism, and post-metaphysics are hanged together.” Readers will be disappointed by
the  recent  work  of  Honnacker  (2018),  who revisits  James  and Schiller,  but  leaves  Rorty  out
entirely. The claim that “anyone who has paid close attention to his work can see a committed
humanism running through it” (Auxier, Kramer & Skowroński 2020: 1) therefore sounds more
like a future interpretation strategy.
19. But Habermas (1985: 12) observed: “As far as Richard Rorty is concerned […] he does not
climb aboard the ‘anti-humanist’ bandwagon, whose trail leads back in Germany to figures as
politically unambiguous as Heidegger and Gehlen. Rorty retains from the pragmatist inheritance
[…] an intuition which links us together – the conviction that a humane collective life depends on
the  vulnerable  forms  of  innovation-bearing,  reciprocal  and  unforcedly  egalitarian  everyday
communication.” 
20. By contrast, a collection of critical essays published in the same year (Malachowski 1990)
identified no explicit humanistic features in Rorty (despite identifying his retreat away from
epistemology towards narratives and poetry, his romantic impulses to self-creation via language,
Rorty’s Humanism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
21
and  the  like)  save  the  authors  of  the  final  essay  who  wrote  “Rorty’s  anti-foundationalist
pragmatism, in contrast,  is  supposed to avoid these ‘dehumanizing’  tendencies in traditional
philosophy. By reminding us of the contingency of our community and of our own identity as
humans, it reaffirms our freedom, and promises a ‘renewed sense of community’ […] What speaks
in favour of adopting the pragmatic standpoint, then, is the hope that we mortal millions living
alone may reach out across the estranging sea and achieve true solidarity if only we come to see
our community as something we make in the free interplay of diverse voices, not something we
find by discovering our human nature” (Guignon & Hiley 1990: 339-40). There is, for instance, no
mention of humanism in another early book-length interpretation of Rorty by Hall (1994). 
21. Kolenda (1923-1991) was a secular humanist  with pragmatist  leanings close to Kurtz and
literary interests close to Rorty’s. He wrote a chapter on pragmatism and humanism for Hollinger
& Depew (1995: 238-55) and published pieces on humanism in Free Inquiry.  In one of these he
wrote: “Humanists are not subjectivists for whom ‘anything goes,’ as their critics claim. Their
commitment to moral fairness is complete and absolute, and not partial and relative” (Kolenda
1981/1982: 16).
22. Rorty’s ethnocentrism is another pillar of his humanism. 
23. Rorty  is  surely  also a humanist  in  the sense  of  Soper’s  “existentialist”  or  “self-creative”
version (ibid.: 116-7), even if she does not explicitly locate him within it. 
24. Rorty cannot be called “a humanist” and nor can his philosophy be considered “pragmatist
humanism/humanistic  pragmatism”  based  on  how  often  the  term  occurs  in  his  work.  In
Philosophy and the Mirror of  Nature “humanism” is mentioned 6 times and only in a historical
context (see Rorty 1979: 59, 171, 373, 376, 378). In Consequences of Pragmatism (1982a) he was more
generous, using the term 17 times, whereas in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) it occurs 7
times, and in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991) just 8 times.
25. He took this idea not only from Nietzsche and Sartre, but also from Dewey who variously
protested against “falling into a paralyzing worship of super-empirical authority” and “loyalty or
obedience to a higher power or authority” (Dewey 1920: 102, 161).
26. The current coronavirus pandemic crisis may serve as a topical example of such an inhuman
situation dictated by the nonhuman condition. 
27. This is the rhetoric of priorities. A Rortyan might take care of the language, and experience
will take care of itself (a Deweyan would probably claim the opposite).
28. In particular his anthropocentrism deserves detailed examination. 
ABSTRACTS
There have been few attempts thus far to read Rorty through a humanistic lens. This paper is an
attempt at making explicit some of the key features of his conception. My main objective is to
show that humanism is integral to his philosophy and to explain what it consists in. I focus on
Rorty’s secular humanism, which I believe lies at the center of his thought. In sections 2 and 3, I
provide an account of  key humanist  sources,  both pragmatist  and non-pragmatist.  Section 4
examines recent interpretations of Rorty as a humanist. In section 5, I focus on the distinction
between the human and nonhuman as the central feature of his humanism. Section 6 outlines
Rorty’s project to humanize humanity. In the concluding section, I summarize the key features of
his humanism. 
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